Molecular and Molar Analyses in Behavior Analysis
Ron Allen, Ph.D., BCBA-D and Jeff Kupfer, Ph.D., BCBA-D
Simmons University and University of Colorado
In 2012, William Baum published an article entitled Rethinking Reinforcement: Allocation, induction, and contingency once again suggesting that a molar analysis was a superior conceptualization or model of behavior-environment interactions than the predominant conceptualization referred to a molecular analysis. The “once again” in the preceding sentence is to note that Baum’s description and development of the Molar approach had its roots back as far as the early 1970s (Baum, 1973). As in prior articles, Baum characterizes the molecular view as relying on the contiguous interactions between discrete events (e.g., responses, reinforcers, discriminative stimuli), the characterization of reinforcement as strengthening behaviors with which it is contiguous, and the conceptualization of operant and respondent conditioning as distinct processes. Alternatively, Baum described the molar approach as concerning temporally-extended activities, contexts, and relations embodied in three central concepts; allocation, induction, and contingency. Allocation is the measure of behavior, induction the process driving behavior, and contingency processes that constrain and connect behavioral and environmental events. Finally, Baum suggests that molar and molecular views are not competing theories, but rather different paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). Further, he states that deciding between the paradigms cannot be done on the basis of data, but on the basis of plausibility and elegance (2012).
The molecular analysis grew directly out of Skinner’s pioneering work. For example, Skinner’s (1948) report concerning the emergence of patterns of behavior under response independent schedules of food delivery. Skinner suggested the activities observed might have emerged when an instance of the activity happened by chance just prior to food delivery. The response may have been adventitiously or superstitiously reinforced, as if there had been an actual contingency in place. However, subsequent research by Staddon and Simmelhag (1971) questioned Skinner’s interpretation after observing both interim and terminal behaviors (without obvious contiguity with food delivery) during the inter-food intervals of response-independent reinforcement.
It is not surprising that the Molar Approach grew out of research done at Harvard University. Herrnstein and his students created much of the experimental and theoretical foundations for the Matching Law (e.g., Baum, 1974, Herrnstein, 1961, 1970). The Matching Law refers to the unity of the relative rates of responding and reinforcement across response options under concurrent variable-interval schedules of reinforcement. These studies are joined by a demonstration and analysis of avoidance behavior maintained by a reduction in the frequency of random unavoidable shocks without exteroceptive stimuli signaling conditions (Herrnstein & Hineline, 1965). As in the matching Law with appetitive stimuli, functional relations were demonstrated between rates of responding and shocks. In contrast, molecular explanations suggested that responses became safety signals through association with periods of relative shock-free circumstances.
The molecular analysis suggests that maintained operant responding results from response-reinforcer contiguity creating response selection and strengthening. The molar approach would suggest that phylogenetically-Important events (PIEs) act to induce responding. Contingencies connect topographically variations to PIEs. Experimental molar analyses involve correlations between rates of PIEs and allocations of responding. However, Skinner (1938) reported an extinction curve of 60 plus responses after the reinforcement of a single lever press, demonstrating the development of substantial responding from a singular event. Perhaps at acquisition, contiguity and contingency are the same, but become distinct with more exposure to contingencies. Killeen (1978), in discussing superstitious behavior, suggested that organisms may be built to “play the longshot” regarding contingency with singular co-existence of a response and a reinforcing event.
Is behavior analysis in the midst of a paradigm shift? Baum has suggested so in prior publications (e.g., Baum, 2002). In science, models or conceptualizations remain current as long as they continue to account for new and existing data. When sufficient new data can not be accounted for, a crisis occurs resulting in a shift to a new paradigm. Similarly, if a prevailing paradigm relies on unobservable variables to account for data (e.g., ether in physics, phlogiston in chemistry, or in behavior analysis, conditioned aversive temporal stimuli or response-based safety signals to account for responding in free-operant avoidance), a more plausible and elegant paradigm may emerge. But, how do we measure plausibility and elegance?
Are there pressures for paradigm shift in the science of behavior? Behavior analysis, in particular applied behavior analysis (ABA), seems to remain strong (despite hard times for funding in science, in general). The molecular approach has a long history and working vocabulary. Is the vocabulary of molar analyses becoming more prevalent in behavior analytic journals? Is there a Molar Analysis Special Interest Group in ABAI? Do we teach the molar approach in our training programs? These might be signs of an imminent paradigm shift.
Some aspects of the molar approach that offer conceptual elegance may be its promise of conceptual unification of respondent and operant conditioning and a more integrated approach to adjunctive or Interim behavior. Additionally, any reduction in the reliance of unobservable processes to account for variability in our subject matter would be beneficial. Science is cumulative and paradigm shifts are difficult and maybe scary. Shifts in paradigm are probably best recognized in the “rear-view mirror”.
References
Baum, W. M. (1973). The correlation-based law of effect. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 20, 137–153. http://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1973.20-137
Baum, W. M. (2002). From molecular to molar: A paradigm shift in behavior analysis. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 78, 95–116.
Baum, W. M. (2012b). Rethinking reinforcement: Allocation, induction, and contingency. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 97, 101–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jeab.2012.97-101
Herrnstein, R. J. (1961). Relative and absolute strength of response as a function of frequency of reinforcement. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 4, 267–272. http://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1961.4-267
Herrnstein, R. J., & Hineline, P. N. (1966). Negative reinforcement as shock-frequency reduction. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 9, 421–430.
Herrnstein, R. J. (1970). On the law of effect. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 243–
266. http://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1970.13-243
Killeen, Peter. (1978). Superstition: A Matter of Bias, Not Detectability. Science (New York, N.Y.). 199. 88-90. 10.1126/science.199.4324.88.
Skinner, B. F. (1938). Behavior of organisms. New York, NY: Appleton–Century–Crofts.
Skinner, B. F. (1948). ‘‘Superstition’’ in the pigeon. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38, 168–172.
Staddon, J. E. R., & Simmelhag, V. (1971). The ‘‘superstition’’ experiment: A re-examination of its implications for the principles of adaptive behavior. Psychological Review, 78, 3–43.