Behavior analysis, science, and culture: What can we learn from selection by consequence?
Jeff Kupfer, Ph.D., BCBA-D and Ron Allen, Ph.D., BCBA-D
University of Colorado and Simmons University
In 1981, Skinner describes three levels of selection, (reproduction, operant conditioning, and cultural evolution) which replaces explanation based on the causal modes of classical mechanics. He emphasizes that delays in recognizing the role of selection in other fields could deprive us of valuable help in solving the problems which confront us (p. 501).
Since that article, there have been other thoughtful articles, specifically addressing issues related to cultural evolution. We believe that the time may be right to consider the importance of these articles, as we may be experiencing a shift in the culture in a direction away from science. For some of us who lived through this in the 1980s, it is curious to find ourselves here once again. Our plan over the next few months is to review several selected articles from behavior analysis related to cultural evolution.
Sigrid Glenn has written extensively on issues related to behavior analysis and cultural evolution (Glenn, 1985; 1988, 1991; 2003; Glenn & Malagodi, 1991), describing the relationships between operant behavior and cultural selection. We selected Glenn (1985) in which she provides a review of some connections between behavior analysis and institutional economics and describes the contributions by Thorstein Veblen and Clarence Ayres. An aim of this paper is to propose that contingencies of reinforcement can serve as a mechanism that provides a basis for conceptual synthesis among the sciences dealing with human behavior (p.16).
Veblen’s proposed two opposing processes of culture: technological and ceremonial. Technological process is associated with science, empirical facts, and cause-and-effect. Ayres specified that technology involves “tools” or the physical products of operant behavior.
In contrast, ceremonial process is associated with animism, superstition, magical powers, privileges of status and empty traditions and legendary beliefs. Unlike technological process that advances culture, ceremonial process is static, resistant to change, and ultimately favors a culture of the past. These are evident in the institutions of family, religion, and state, all which change to keep up with changes in the environment produced by technology (e.g., tele-evangelism, drive-in Sunday services).
The net outcome of these opposing processes is economic progress from technological process that is hindered or prevented by ceremonial process maintained by social institutions. Social reinforcement, for example, can function to develop and promote technological performances, but ceremonial processes arrange suppressing contingencies to run in opposition of[RA1] technological advances. The emergence of a social movement against the management and distribution of vaccines reveals the undercurrent of ceremonial processes at play in the U.S. currently. There are others such as: climate change, planned parenthood, education, diversity and inclusion, housing, immigration, and healthcare, in general. To be clear, “ceremonial activities are held together by social reinforcement unrelated to consequences deriving from the uncontrived relations between behavior and the environment, including the human environment” (p.19). Glenn suggests the compelling reason for the emergence of ceremonial behavior is related to individuals or groups that extracted rules from contingencies of reinforcement in the environment resulting in a change in status that eventually drifted from the original relation to technological behavior. The name “Kennedy” has had a cultural influence on the public since 1950, but we have drifted far from the “race to put man on the moon” to the “race to ban vaccines”). An additional problem: spokespersons for technological processes are challenged by persons of status in ceremonial positions (e.g., Fauci endured public humiliation for his role in protecting the public).
A major maintaining contingency of reinforcement for ceremonial behavior is the perpetuation of control over the distribution of reinforcers and keeping the status quo – the reason for resistance to change and progress that could disrupt behavioral repertoires of persons of status. In most cases, institutional aversive control is arranged to maintain the status quo and control.
Glenn illustrates the weeding out of ceremonial control of human behavior, largely created by dualism, by Freud, Watson, and Skinner. The remnants, however, remain in cognitive psychology in which a smattering of brain science is included to bolster a pre-scientific foundation of human behavior as form without substance. Advances in a science of human behavior continues to be resisted, its technology and its philosophy. It is misrepresented in academia and the technology is now being carefully reined in by insurance companies and institutionalized agencies such as Medicaid. For example, under the guise of “clinical review”, Medicaid requires behavior analysts to supply an exorbitant burden of proof of treatment methodology at the time and expense of the providers when they could be providing actual services to individual needing care. In sharp contrast, there are no reciprocal requirement for psychologists, psychiatrists, professional counselors, social workers, occupational therapists, physical therapists, or speech language pathologists.
Perhaps the most disturbing part of the picture above is that the practices and treatments in applied behavior analysis are being selected by a faceless group of individuals that have no oversight by the greater ABA scientific community. Rather, they are agents from ceremonial origins within Medicaid and government-operated health care systems. Glenn concludes her article describing an opportunity for ABA to self-examine progress as a science, as well as a practice. We may begin this process by examining the contingencies of reinforcement governing our decisions about who we serve, the specific reasons why we do so, who benefits from this service, who pays for it, and finally, are these decisions and verbal rules generated under the control of technological process.
Many years ago, Hank Pennypacker remarked in class: “if you build a better mousetrap the world rushes in to drive the innovation to mediocrity.” Hank was right and his comments to the ABAI assembly in 1986 still ring true: “Let’s buy in without selling out” (Pennypacker, 1986).
References:
Glenn, S.S. (1985). Some reciprocal roles between behavior analysis and institutional economics in Post-Darwinian science. The Behavior Analyst, 8(1), 15-27
Glenn, S. S. (1988). Contingencies and metacontingencies: Toward a synthesis of behavior analysis and cultural materialism. The Behavior Analyst, 11, 161-179.
Glenn, S. S. (1991). Contingencies and metacontingencies: Relations among behavioral, cultural, and biological evolution. Behavioral analysis of societies and cultural practices, 39-73.
Glenn, S. S. (2003). Operant contingencies and the origin of cultures. In Behavior theory and philosophy (pp. 223-242). Boston, MA: Springer US.
Glenn, S. S., & Malagodi, E. F. (1991). Process and content in behavioral and cultural phenomena. Behavior and Social Issues, 1, 1-14.
Pennypacker, H.S. (1986). The challenge of technology transfer: Buying in without selling out. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 147-156.
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by Consequences. Science, 213(4507), 501-504
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