Glenn – On the Evolution of Culture
Jeff Kupfer, Ph.D., BCBA-D and Ron Allen, Ph.D., BCBA-D
University of Colorado and Simmons University
The U.S. culture is in a tailspin and control is far out of the reach of behavior analysis. To say that culture is complicated often translates into it cannot be analyzed sufficiently to make a difference, not anytime soon. Cultural analysis has been on the radar of behavior analysis since Skinner (1981) describes three levels of analysis and the relation between them. Malagodi (1986) proposes that radical behaviorism must be inclusive of a cultural analysis in keeping with a “thorough going” science of behavior, and suggested building alliances with other natural sciences concerned with cultural evolution which share an epistemological umbrella. Forty-five years after Skinner’s selection by consequence, and given the current cultural turmoil, we will focus on several models and activities within ABA described over the years. Specifically, we will review selected work by Sigrid Glenn and (next month) Billy Baum.
Although Glenn’s model has undergone revisions over the years, there are consistent features (e.g., interlocking contingencies, repetition of acts extended over time). Glenn & Malagodi (1991) outlines the discrepancy between our scientific understanding of physical and biological phenomena, and behavioral and cultural phenomena. They make a distinction between content (phenomena to be explained by scientific principles) and process (statements about lawful relations). Behavioral principles are content-free in that they describe processes and explain content.
Glenn & Malagodi (1991) apply contingencies of reinforcement to interlocking contingencies between two or more members of the group. A nomoclone is a cultural unit comprised of interlocking behavioral contingencies involving two or more individuals as it occurs in a particular context and is repeated across time. Whereas, a permaclone occurs when interaction and outcome remain relatively unchanged after some of the people are replaced by others. The proposed unit of cultural evolution: (1) must be capable of extending in time beyond a single generation; (2) must be based on observable objects and/or events.
Glenn continued to expand on these earlier principles, often referring to the work of other theorists such as Cultural Materialist, Marvin Harris. In her chapter entitled: Operant Contingencies and the Origin of Cultures, Glenn (2003) proposes that an explanation of the origin and evolution of cultures requires going beyond the evolutionary and behavioral principles that account for species characteristics and the learned behavior of individual organisms (p. 224). Glenn discusses Selectionist theories and how complexity might be addressed without appealing to prior design:
- Complexity (e.g., organic complexity) results from repeated rounds of selection acting on phenomena resulting from earlier rounds of selection
- Complexity of structure and function increases over time when complexity adds value to the fit between individuals in a lineage undergoing selection and the selecting environment
- More complexity does not mean better adapted to, or more evolved via selection because organisms are composed of many parts with complex interrelated functions.
Glenn compares several theoretical positions (Dawkins, Wilson) and describes Hull (1980) in more detail, mainly that “genes are replicators accounting for the retention of organismic characteristics of a species, whereas organisms and colonies play the role of interactor in organic selection as cohesive wholes that interact differentially with their environments, and results in differential replication of genes in organic lineages.” Thus, a lineage of genes/organisms is the entity that evolves and changes indefinitely through time because of replication and differential interaction. Glenn points out the problem with selectionist accounts involves identifying units of replication that retain in the lineage needed for the units of interaction that differentially fit the world outside themselves.
Glenn provides more detail about operant lineage requirements by example of the behavior of washing sand off a sweet potato by Imo, a captive macaque, recorded by observers. Novel behavior could be accounted through adventitious reinforcement, accident, response generalization, or adduction (interconnection of two repertoires); once established the consequences of less-sand/more-potato increased and maintained Imo’s behavior.
Next, there must be a necessary relation between behavior acquired “uniquely” by one organism and behavior similar in topography or stimulus control appearing later in the repertoire of another organism (e.g., imitation or delayed imitation). Behaviors comprising an operant lineage function as a cultural-level replicator only if they evoke behavior that is novel in the repertoire of the learner.
Glenn suggests that such operant behavior is required for the emergence of culturo-behavioral lineages– the link between behavioral and cultural processes, and that replication of operant behavior across successive repertoires in which the behavior of earlier learners functions as part of the behavior environment of later learners. Finally, there must be repetition of the behavioral contingency maintaining the originally learned behavior. In the case of Imo (above), if another macaque’s potato-washing behavior is maintained, it would result in double the number of acts to evoke the same behavior in other macaques.
Glenn contrasts this model with others. For example, Dawkins (1976) and Blackmore (1999) proposed that memes (cultural replicators) are usually based on imitation of actions but can consist of thoughts and ideas, that is, the tendency to localize “cognitive replicators in the brain” rather than examining the variables that govern behavior from another level of analysis. Cognitive diversions of this sort have been discussed by Harris (1989): “Nothing in our genes tells our brains to use floppy disks rather than stone plaques, to live in high rise condominiums rather than caves, to eat meat from Black Angus cattle rather than wild horse.”
Glenn points out that only overt behavior can function as part of the behavioral environment of a conspecific. She suggests that although replication in behavioral lineages may occur at the level of neural events, but replication in cultural lineages must occur at the level of overt acts, and that which must be replicated across repertoires (cultural transmission) are not just learned acts but behavior-environment relations to be selected by their reinforcing consequences.
Thus, operant lineages belong to the repertoires of individuals and do not exist after that “host” organism dies. So how do we know if a culture-behavioral lineage exists? If the operant lineage of any participant repertoires continues being replicated in the repertoire of other participants.
Glenn describes the emergence of cultural-level interactors and discusses interrelated behavior based on interlocking contingencies (e.g., two hunters that work in tandem to capture prey). For example, research examining cooperative behavior, Hake & Vukerlich (1973) suggests cooperation between two subjects working to maximize payoffs is well maintained when payoffs for individuals meet or exceed payoffs for behaving independently or resulted in less effort if the subjects worked together. That is, individuals cooperate when interdependent behavior produces more reinforcement than independent behavior.
The final topic Glenn addresses are metacontingencies, which are the relations between interlocking behavioral contingencies and their consequences— they describe the process by which complex cultural entities evolve. Interlocking behavioral contingencies function as a cohesive unit (cultural interactor) in the cultural selection processes.
To summarize: cultural level selection happens when: (1) in cultural selection, operant behavior is a culturo-level replicator; (2) repetitions of operant behaviors under the control of conspecifics are required for culturo-behavior lineages; and (3) behavior replicated in these lineages become part of repetitions of interlocking behavioral contingencies.
Readers are encouraged to explore more of Glenn’s articles on the topic of cultural evolution. For example, Glenn and other ABA theorists writing on cultural evolution (See Glenn et al., 2016) have attempted to arrive at consensus on behavioral terms used to describe cultural events for the following term : metacontingency, culturo-behavioral lineage, macrobehavior, macrocontingency, cultural cusp. Additionally, Glenn has been actively involved in laboratory research related to cultural issues and metacontingency analysis (Borba, Tourinho, & Glenn, 2014; Vichi, Andery, M.A.P.A, & Glenn, 2009).
REFERENCES
Borba, A., Tourinho, E.Z. & Glenn, S.S. (2014). Establishing the Macrobehavior of Ethical Self-Control in an Arrangement of Macrocontingencies in Two Microcultures. Behavior and Social Issues. 23, 68–86
Blackmore, S. (1999). The meme machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford University Press.
Glenn, S.S. (2003). Operant contingencies and the origin of cultures. In K.A. Lattal & Chase, P.N. (Eds.) Behavior theory and philosophy. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York.
Glenn, S.S. & Malagodi, E.F. (1991). Process and content in behavioral and cultural phenomena. Behavior and Social Issues, 1(2), 1-14.
Glenn, S.S., Maloltt, M.E., Andery, M.A.P.A. et al. (2016). Toward Consistent Terminology in a Behaviorist Approach to Cultural Analysis. Behavior and Social Issues 25, 11–27
Hake, D.F. & Vukelich, R. (1973). Analysis of the control exerted by a complex cooperation procedure. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 19, 3-16.
Harris, M. (1989). Our kind. New York: Harper & Row.
Hull, D.L. (1980). Individuality and selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 11, 311-332.
Malagodi, E.F. (1986) On radicalizing behaviorism: A call for cultural analysis. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 1-17.
Skinner, B.F. (1981). Selection by Consequence. Science, 213, 501-504.
Vichi, C., Andery, M.A.P.A. and Glenn, S. S. (2009). A metacontingency experiment: The effects of contingent consequences on patterns of interlocking contingencies of reinforcement. Behavior and Social Issues, 18, 41-57.